We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e®ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three. In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate. More e±cient workers invest more often and employers bid higher for workers who have invested. More e±cient workers also earn higher wages. Employers' pro¯ts are usually not di®erent from zero. Increased competition leads to higher wages only in the signaling sessions. We¯nd that workers in the screening sessions invest more often and earn higher wages when there are two employers.
Introduction
Spence's (1973, 1974 ) work on \market signaling" is a seminal contribution to economics. It is one of the¯rst treatments of incomplete information and has led to a large body of theoretical and empirical papers. Spence's idea is simple. In a labor-market context, he studies investments in education which have no productive value and no intrinsic value either. The reason workers may nevertheless invest in such apparently super°uous education is that it may serve as a signal to potential employers. By choosing to invest in education, highly productive workers distinguish themselves from less productive workers. The potential employers cannot observe the ability of the workers, but they know that investing in education is cheaper for highly able workers. Therefore, education serves as a credible signal of unobserved productivity, and it is rewarded with a higher wage. As education is correlated with productivity, it has a sorting e®ect.
The Spence game had an enormous in°uence on game theory itself as it triggered the literature on signaling games and equilibrium re¯nements. Many of the theoretical contributions have focussed on the emergence of separating equilibria. In a separating equilibrium, workers who have di®erent unobserved productivity levels choose di®erent levels of education. Among others, Riley (1979a) , Cho and Kreps (1987) , Banks and Sobel (1987) , Cho and Sobel (1990) and Mailath et al. (1993) analyzed conditions and criteria under which the separating equilibrium is likely to occur. The main implication of this literature is that, even though other equilibria with pooling of types exist, often only separating equilibria survive the application of equilibrium re¯nements. In this sense, the sorting e®ect is theoretically robust.
In this paper, we report on experiments designed to analyze Spence's (1973 Spence's ( , 1974 ) model.
Our main question is to what extent and under which conditions wasteful signaling occurs. Previous experiments on signaling games suggest that equilibrium re¯nements cannot reliably predict behavior. 1 Rather, the success of re¯nements depends on \inconsequential" changes of the payo® structure as outcomes are path dependent (Brandts and Holt, 1992 Holt, , 1994 Cooper et al., 1997a,b) . Cooper et al. (1997b, p. 553) conclude that these \[e]xperiments have raised serious doubts about the validity of equilibrium re¯nements." Thus, one goal of this study is to investigate the role of path dependence and re¯nements in the Spence education game which has not been studied in experiments before. We design markets such that education has no direct value for either workers or employers, and we control for workers' actual ability to ensure that there are no productivity e®ects of sorting. In our setup, investing in education is entirely wasteful, and workers pooling on a zero level of education would be an ex-ante Pareto improvement. In this \pure" Spence environment, we investigate whether or not signaling occurs and which factors facilitate it.
We focus on two features of the game that may a®ect signaling. Firstly, we analyze the education game both in its original signaling version as well as in a setup with screening by the employers. In the screening variant of the Spence game (e.g., Rasmusen, 1994) , the sequence of moves is reversed. The employers move¯rst by o®ering two wages, contingent on the investment decision. Then, moving second, the workers decide whether or not to invest in education. This model captures for example the situation of job candidates¯rst receiving information about salaries for jobs that require college education and those that do not and then deciding whether or not to go to college. The motivation for running the screening variant is to analyze whether institutional changes cause di®erences in results. One institution may turn out to be better suited for job-market separating of types than the other. As screening in an incomplete information experiment has not been studied before, our screening treatments should be of some stand-alone interest.
Our second treatment variable analyzes the impact of competition in the markets. Employer competition is an essential part of the Spence model|in contrast to many signaling models with a single responder. Two or more employers bid for the worker in wage competition µ a la Bertrand. As a result, employers (receivers) get the same expected pro¯ts across di®erent equilibrium outcomes.
Theoretically, increasing the number of employers has no impact on the prediction but it may nevertheless a®ect the outcome in experiments (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000) . For example, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) have analyzed Bertrand oligopolies with two, three and four¯rms. They show that the Bertrand solution does not predict well with two¯rms, but predicts well when the number of¯rms is three or four. If wages get more competitive with three employers, this might a®ect investments in education positively. Or, put di®erently, if employers successfully collude on low wages, signaling might not be pro¯table for workers any more as the wage may be insu±cient to cover the cost of education. Hence, the separating equilibrium may lose predictive power. We analyze this issue by employing treatments with two and three competing employers. 2 2 There are two other studies with receiver competition, but they do not systematically vary the number of receivers.
Cadsby, Frank, and Maksimovic (1998) test a signaling model with a large number of competing investors. Miller and Plott (1985) investigate an open o®er market where six buyers and six sellers can make bids. In this study, there
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There are some interesting and in°uential¯eld-data studies on this topic which provide evidence in favor of the Spence hypothesis. 3 Basically, these papers found evidence that is consistent with the signaling model but inconsistent with a pure human-capital model of education (Becker, 1964) . We believe that our experiments nicely complement these studies. Note, for example, that (wasteful) investments in education can still be second-best in the¯eld. The¯rst-best outcome in which ability or productivity is observable is not feasible. However, compared to pooling of types, and therefore a purely random allocation of types to jobs, sorting might have productive e®ects as it might help employers to allocate workers according to their comparative advantage. In our experiments, there are no such productive e®ects of education, that is, we test the theory in an environment in which education is purely dissipative. Furthermore, we are not aware of¯eld data evidence on the e®ects of our treatment variables (signaling vs. screening and two vs. three employers). Here, experimental data might help to assess the behavioral relevance of the di®erent variants of the model.
The next section presents the model underlying our experiments. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 reports the results, and Section 5 concludes.
Theory
In this section, we lay out the simple model underlying our experiments and derive the gametheoretic predictions. We provide the results for the model with one worker and two employers.
We ran experimental treatments with two and three employers, but it will be obvious that the theoretical results are not a®ected by adding a third employer. We start with the predictions for the signaling treatments and then add those for the screening variant.
The timing of the signaling game is as follows:
1. Nature chooses the worker's ability a 2 f10; 50g where low (a = 10) and high (a = 50) ability are equally likely. Workers know a but employers do not.
2. The worker chooses an education level s 2 f0; 1g which is observed by the employers.
is asymmetric information about the quality of the good, but a costly signal is available to the seller. By varying the cost of the signal, they¯nd that with relatively costly signals, more separating occurs than pooling compared to the case of relatively cheap signals.
3 Early empirical¯ndings, e.g. Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) , were against the Spence hypothesis but later studies provided evidence in favor it. These papers include Wolpin (1997), Riley (1979b) , Lang and Kropp (1986) and Bedard (2001) . 
4.
The employer who o®ered the higher wage hires the worker. In case of a tie, a fair random draw decides which employer hires the worker.
Payo®s are as follows:
where w equals the higher of the two wage o®ers.
25 + a ¡ w; for the employer who hired the worker 25; for the other employer.
The payo®s in (1) and (2) indicate that the worker gets the wage minus his cost of education, whereas the hiring employer's payo® is a¯xed payment plus the di®erence between the worker's ability and the wage. The non-hiring employer receives the¯xed payment only. 4 Note that the cost of education is 450=10 = 45 for the low type and 450=50 = 9 for the high type of the worker.
Note also that a worker's strategy is to specify an investment decision (a signal) given his type realization whereas an employer's strategy is to specify a wage o®er for each of the two signals she might receive.
The appropriate solution concept is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, comprising a strategy pro¯le and a system of beliefs. Prior beliefs on the worker's type are common knowledge. Posterior beliefs after the worker has chosen the educational level s are as follows. Let p = P rob(a = high j s = 1) denote an employer's belief that the worker has high ability after observing that the worker invested in education (and hence 1¡ p = P rob(a = low j s = 1)). Likewise, let q = P rob(a = high j s = 0) denote an employer's belief that the worker has high ability after observing that the worker did not invest in education (and hence 1 ¡ q = Prob(a = low j s = 0)).
The game above has two equilibria|a pooling and a separating equilibrium. Let us start with the pooling equilibrium:
4 We introduced this¯xed positive payment since employers earn zero expected payo®s in both equilibria of the game (see below). Like Holt (1985) , we prefer employers to earn a strictly positive payo® in equilibrium to avoid frustration which might trigger unreasonable behavior of subjects.
In this equilibrium, both types of the worker do not invest in education, and the two employers o®er a wage equal to the expected value of the worker's ability (0:5£10+0:5£50 = 30). Note that the employers' information sets corresponding to s = 0 are on the equilibrium path. Therefore, the belief q is dictated by Bayes' rule and the worker's strategy. In contrast, the employers' information sets corresponding to s = 1 are o® the equilibrium path. Hence, Bayes' rule does not pin down the employer's beliefs and we are free to choose beliefs p: In (3) employers assume that a worker who chooses s = 1 has high ability with the prior probability 0:5: In this equilibrium, both types of the worker earn payo® 30 whereas both employers earn an expected payo® consisting only of the¯xed payment of 25 (for a proof of the equilibrium, see the Appendix A). While the pooling equilibrium (3) is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, it can be ruled out by applying Cho and Kreps' (1987) \intuitive criterion" (see Appendix A).
Next consider the separating equilibrium:
s(low) = 0; s(high) = 1 w(0) = 10; w(1) = 50
In this equilibrium, the low-ability worker does not invest in education whereas the high-ability worker does. The employers condition their wage on the signal they receive. They pay a wage which is equal to the low type's ability in case of no education whereas they pay a wage which equals the high type's ability after the \education" signal. Since both signals can be observed in equilibrium, the beliefs of the employers are determined by Bayes' rule and the worker's strategy, and we have p = 1 and q = 0: In this equilibrium the low type earns pro¯t 10 ¡ 0 = 10 whereas the high type earns 50 ¡ 9 = 41: Again, the expected payo®s of both employers are equal to the¯xed payment of 25 (proof, see Appendix A).
Comparing the equilibria, note that the high type is better o® in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium (41 > 30) and vice versa for the low type (10 < 30). The ex-ante expected payo® for the worker is larger in the pooling equilibrium though (30 > 0:5 ¢ 41 + 0:5 ¢ 10 = 25:5). This di®erence in expected wages is equal to the welfare loss of the separating equilibrium as the expected payo® for the employer is the same in both equilibria. Thus, the pooling equilibrium is both ex-ante payo® dominant for the worker and welfare dominant. Now consider the screening variant. The timing of the screening game is as follows.
1. Nature chooses the worker's ability a 2 f10; 50g: Workers know a but employers do not.
2. The employers each o®er two wages, w(s) 2 [0; 60]; s 2 f0; 1g; which are conditional on the education decision: The worker learns the higher wage for each contingency. In case of a tie, a fair random draw decides whose wage is displayed.
3. The worker chooses an education level s 2 f0; 1g.
4.
The employer who o®ered the higher wage for the education level chosen by the worker hires the worker.
Payo®s are as above in the signaling variant.
There is no pooling equilibrium in this game, and the unique prediction is a separating equilibrium with wage and investment levels as described above (for a proof of both results, see Appendix A).
Let us¯nally mention that in a model with three employers competing for the worker, the equilibria are exactly the same as with two employers. The arguments to establish these equilibria are identical, so we abstain from reiterating them.
To summarize, the signaling model with either two or three employers has both a separating and a pooling equilibrium. However, based on the \intuitive criterion," a strong case can be made against the pooling equilibrium. The screening model, both with two and three employers, has a unique separating equilibrium outcome that coincides with the one in the signaling model.
Experimental design and procedures
We compare two markets, one in which the informed workers move¯rst (signaling markets, henceforth SIG) and one in which the uninformed employers are the¯rst movers (screening markets, called SCR). As a second treatment variable, we study the e®ect of varying the number of employers (two versus three). Thus, we ran four di®erent treatments resulting from a 2 £ 2 design. The SIG2 and SCR2 sessions involved 9 subjects each whereas the SIG3 and SCR3 sessions involved 12 subjects each.
On the one hand, the design should be as close as possible to a single-period interaction between subjects. On the other hand, there is need for learning in such a complex environment.
Therefore, we decided to allow for many repetitions, but we randomly rematched subjects in every period. More precisely, with two (three) competing employers, the 9 (12) participants were ran-domly matched in every period into groups of three (four) subjects, consisting of one worker and two (three) employers.
To enhance learning we employed role switching. That is, participants played both in the role of the worker and in the role of the employer. All sessions lasted for 48 rounds. In the treatments with two employers, we partitioned the 48 rounds of the experiment into six \blocks" consisting of eight consecutive rounds. Within a block of eight rounds, roles did not change. All subjects played the role of the worker for two blocks and the role of the employer for four blocks. In principle, after being a worker for one block, subjects took on the role of employer for two blocks.
(For some subjects this pattern was di®erent at the beginning and at the end of the experiment.)
In sessions with three employers, we partitioned the 48 rounds of each session into eight blocks of six rounds. Here, subjects played in the role of the worker for two blocks and in the role of the employer for six blocks. As before, roles did not change within blocks. The usual pattern of role switching was that, after being a worker for one block, subjects were in the employer's role for three blocks. The computer screen indicated the current role of the participant throughout the experiment.
Decision making in each round of the experiment was exactly as described in the theory section above. In both the signaling and the screening game, there was a random move¯rst, selecting the worker's type. Whereas workers were informed about their individual types, employers
were not. In the signaling game, workers then had to decide whether or not they wanted to make an \investment." 5 Third, after learning about the investment decision of the worker (but without learning the type of the worker), employers were asked to submit a wage o®er. Finally, the worker was hired by the employer who submitted the higher wage o®er (possibly after a random computer draw in case of a tie). 6 In the screening treatment, employers¯rst had to submit wage bids for the case that the worker invests and for the case the worker does not invest. Then the worker made her investment decision. Finally, the worker was hired by the employer with the highest wage bid given the investment decision. 5 We avoided the term \education" as it might bias decisions. The instructions simply asked the workers to decide whether or not they want to make an \investment." It was not speci¯ed what the nature of this investment was.
Before the start of our experimental sessions, subjects occasionally asked why they should invest into something which has no value. Also post-experimental questionnaires reveal that subjects understood that the investment per se has no value. 6 We decided to automatically give the worker the higher wage and not to let workers reject wages in order to simplify the design.
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After each round, the computer screen displayed the following feedback information: type and investment decision of the worker, wage o®ers of both employers (with an indication of which employer hired the worker), own pro¯ts as well as the pro¯ts of the other group members of that round and own accumulated pro¯t.
Experiments were computerized 7 and were conducted at Royal Holloway, University of London. The experiments were run from October 2001 to October 2002. In total, 126 subjects participated. Upon arrival in the lab, subjects (undergraduate as well as a few graduate students from all over the campus) were assigned a computer and received written instructions. After reading the instructions, subjects were allowed to ask questions privately.
We conducted three sessions for each treatment. Sessions lasted about one and a half hours. Earnings were denoted in a¯ctitious currency called \points." The¯xed exchange rate of $1 for 150 points was commonly known. In addition to their earnings, subjects received a one-o® endowment of 200 points at the beginning of the experiment. This was done to cover possible losses that could{and occasionally did{occur in the beginning of a session. Subjects' average monetary earnings were $9.40, including the initial endowment and a show-up fee.
Results

Main Findings
We summarize the data about worker and employer behavior in Table 1 . For workers, Table 1 shows investment rates for each type. For employers, it shows average wage o®ers (i.e., averages of all wage o®ers observed) as well as average wages paid (i.e., average of wages that have been actually paid in the experiments).
To test for signi¯cance of di®erences in the data, we run regressions for the investment decisions of workers, the wages paid by employers and pro¯ts. As independent variables we use the worker's type (high vs. low ), the investment decision of workers (yes vs. no), or treatment as a dummy. We run probit regressions for the investment choice and linear regressions for the wages and pro¯ts and test whether the coe±cient of the dummy is statistically di®erent from zero. 8 We use 7 We used the software tool kit z-Tree, developed by Fischbacher (1999). 8 For example, to test whether employers in a signalling game pay more upon observing investment rather than observing no investment by a worker, we use the estimation equation wage =¯0 +¯1Dummy + "i where the variable Dummy is equal to 0 after no investment and equal to 1 after the worker invested. White (1980) robust standard errors and we adjust for possible non-independence of observations within sessions. 9 For the regressions, we restrict attention to the decisions from the last block in each session, that is, the last eight games in the treatments with two employers and the last six games in the treatments with three employers.
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First we will provide a number of general results which hold across all four treatments.
Result 1 High types of workers invest signi¯cantly more often than low types of workers.
Investment rates of high types are signi¯cantly higher in all treatments at the 1% level. Table 1 indicates that theses di®erences are also quantitatively substantial. Low types clearly invest less often in education, and their investment rate is practically zero towards the end of the experiment. This indicates that the di®erent types separate themselves by their investment choice. This is clearly displayed by Figures 1 and 2 . Figure 1 shows the average investment in every period for high types and low types, both for the signaling game with two and three employers. Figure 2 represents investment decisions in the two screening treatments. In all treatments, the investment rate of high types is always above the investment rate of low types. And this e®ect becomes more pronounced over time. The low types' investment rate is negatively correlated over time while that of high types is positively correlated in all treatments. The di®erence between the investment rates of high and low types signi¯cantly increases over time (SIG2 and SCR2: 1%, SCR3: 5% level) except in treatment SIG3.
Notice that the investment decision in the screening sessions is actually a simple binary choice. Workers know the highest wage for both investment decisions. They only have to choose the option which maximizes their payo®. The data indicate a high proportion of payo®-maximizing decisions as 90% (SCR2) and 91% (SCR3) of all investment decisions over all periods were rational. Moreover, the number of rational decisions is signi¯cantly higher in the second half of the experiment, that is, subjects learn to make the right decisions. The few irrational decisions show a certain bias. Taking both treatments together, 70 out of a total of 81 wrong investment decisions were taken in situations where a worker should have invested but decided not to do so. This can be
Observations might not be independent because of the random matching of subjects within sessions. We account for this by forming clusters (here a cluster is one session) when running our regressions (see STATA Corp. explained by the fact that low types face a simpler task as they should never invest, independent of the wage o®ers, whereas high types must condition their choice on the actual wage o®ers.
Result 2 Wages are signi¯cantly higher for workers who invest. Table 1 shows that average wages paid are higher for workers who invest in education compared to those who do not invest. This is signi¯cant for SIG2 and SCR2 at the 5% level and for SIG3 and SCR3 at 10%. As above, the time trend is also in favor of the separating equilibrium (see again Figures 1 and 2 ). Gross earnings of workers who invested are positively correlated over time while earnings of workers who did not invest are negatively correlated over time. 11 The wage spread signi¯cantly increases over time in all treatments (at the 1% level; SCR3: 5% level). Very similar results hold when studying wage o®ers instead of wages paid. Table 1 shows that wage o®ers are higher when s = 1 and this is signi¯cant in SIG2, SIG3 and SCR3 (5% level).
Result 3 High types of workers earn higher pro¯ts.
For workers' earnings and pro¯ts, refer to Table 2 . In the pooling equilibrium both types earn the same (30 points) as neither type invests. The separating equilibrium predicts that high types earn 41 points while low types earn 10 points. The table indicates that high types earn more on average as predicted but this result is generally not signi¯cant, except in SIG2 (10% level). The di®erences presumably fail to be signi¯cant because the separation of high and low types is not complete. In particular, a considerable number of high types earn low wages because they do not invest (we will elaborate on this below).
Result 4 Employers' net pro¯ts are not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero|except in SIG2.
Employers are predicted to compete in a Bertrand fashion, leading to zero pro¯ts both in the pooling and the separating equilibrium. Employers' net earnings, reported in Table 2 , are, by all means, small on average (recall that employers received a¯xed payment of 25 in every period, but we report net earnings here). For the case of no investment, they are even negative on average in all treatments but SIG2. 12 We estimated 95% con¯dence intervals around the pro¯t means, again accounting for possible dependence of observations. Pro¯ts are not di®erent from zero, apart from the SIG2 treatment where we observe a small positive pro¯t.
11 An exception occurs for SCR2 where earnings following an investment are slightly negatively correlated over time (½ = ¡0:075) which is due to the behavior in one of the three sessions. 12 This¯nding may be due to the presentation of total earnings after each round on the screen, including the¯xed payment of 25. Thus, employers never saw a negative number even if they made moderate losses. 
Session-and Individual-Level Data
We complement these aggregate results with a view of the data at the session and at the individual is represented by a circle. If there is one or more petals in the circle, this indicates that accordingly more individuals have the same pair of investment rates. From the¯gures it is evident that many subjects invest more often as a high than as a low type, and a considerable fraction perfectly conforms to the separating prediction. In total, 54 out of 126 subjects always invest when they are the high type and they never invest when they are the low type. This clear-cut behavior by so many subjects is strong support for the separating equilibrium prediction. A small number of subjects (17 in total) never invest, suggesting pooling behavior. The remaining subjects often do not invest when they are a, low type and invest with a probability smaller than one when they are a high type.
In the same manner, we graph wage-setting behavior at the individual level on the righthand sides of Figures 7 and 8 in Appendix C, again separately for the four treatments and using the data from the second half of the experiment. The average wage o®ered by a subject when s=1 is on the vertical axis and the average wage o®ered when s=0 is on the horizontal axis. The vast majority of subjects (93 out of 126) o®ers a strictly higher wage for investing workers, that is, their circle is above the 45 ± -line in Figures 7 and 8 . Regarding absolute wage levels, behavior is quite dispersed but an average wage of 10 for non-investing workers appears to be modal. This supports the separating equilibrium prediction while the support for the pooling of wages is weak: only four subjects o®er the same average wage regardless of the investment decision. We summarize Result 5 Session and individual level data overall indicate the separating of types.
Discussion
To summarize, our results roughly support the separating equilibrium prediction. High and low types of workers clearly behave di®erently in their investment behavior, and employers reward investing workers with higher wages. Also, there is tough employer competition leading to zero net pro¯ts as predicted.
A number of observations are not consistent with the theory. Investment rates of high types of workers are below 100%, and it is fairly evident that separation of high and low types is incomplete. Wages do not perfectly conform to the predicted levels of 10 and 50 either. For this reason, Result 3 concerning pro¯ts of high and low types turned out to be not signi¯cant. Furthermore, Table 2 shows that employers earn higher pro¯ts when employing workers who invested. 14 This is not in line with the separating equilibrium.
These observations are mutually consistent, and they indicate that a small amount of noisy behavior is present. Given that some high types do not invest, a wage higher than the predicted wage of 10 following no investment seems plausible. On the other hand, given that some low types invested early in the game (and very few even towards the end), it also seems reasonable that employers o®er less than the separating equilibrium bid of 50. In turn, some high-type workers experience that their investment does not pay. This might induce them to refrain from investing in later periods.
It seems that path dependence might explain the persistence of high types who do not always invest although, ex-post and on average, it pays to do so. By contrast, the investment never pays for a low type, which explains why the low types' investment rates are close to the predicted level of zero in the last periods of the experiment. A second explanation for too little investment by high types could be that subjects do not only maximize own payo®s. Recall that investment is purely wasteful here. Subjects often exhibit a preference for e±ciency (see Charness and Rabin, 2002) , which might explain why some of them are reluctant to invest.
In the following, we present the results regarding our treatment variables, that is the number of employers and the order of moves. Let us start with the e®ect of having three rather than two employers. Figure 1 displays the results of treatment SIG2 (normal lines) and SIG3 (bold lines). The two bold lines in the right panel of Figure 1 representing wages paid in treatment SIG3 are both shifted upwards compared to the lines representing treatment SIG2. Workers who did not invest received on average 7 points less in SIG2 compared to SIG3. A worker who invested received 32.55 points in SIG2 whereas he received 41.1 points with three employers. This di®erence is signi¯cant for high worker types only. Thus, wages are higher with three employers than with two for both investment decisions. As a result, adding a third employer reduces employer pro¯ts in the signaling game (this is signi¯cant for high worker types).
The E®ect of Increased Employer Competition
Regarding investment decisions there is no signi¯cant di®erence between the signaling treatments with two and three employers. 15 In the left panel of Figure 1 there are no apparent di®erences. 
Signaling vs. Screening
Finally, we compare behavior in the signaling and the screening experiments. Figure 3 shows the signaling and screening sessions with two employers while Figure 4 displays the results with three employers. It can be taken from Figure 3 that while investment rates in the signaling and screening treatments with two employers are similar, wages of workers are clearly higher in the screening sessions. However, these wage di®erences disappear when competition is increased to three employers, and Figure 4 does not reveal any di®erences in investment behavior towards the end of the experiment.
Statistical tests on the basis of the last eight (six) rounds of the experiment yield:
In the screening treatment, both types of workers earn signi¯cantly higher wages, high types of workers earn signi¯cantly higher pro¯ts, and employers earn signi¯cantly lower pro¯ts when employing either type of worker. Investment rates do not di®er signi¯cantly. To summarize, adding a third employer only has an e®ect on the market outcome of the signaling treatments which is driven by the relatively low wage levels in SIG2. One explanation for the low wage in SIG2 is that the signaling game facilitates collusion among two employers compared to the screening game. In the signaling game, employers choose a wage o®er after observing the investment choice by the worker. In contrast, in the screening game employers o®er a menu of wages for every possible investment level. The decision task in the screening games is similar to the task in sequential-move experiments where the so-called strategy method is employed. With the strategy method, subjects are asked to specify a response for every possible choice of the¯rst mover|as opposed to responding only to the actual choice of the¯rst mover. Previous experimental¯ndings suggest that the strategy method leads to less cooperation between players, which is consistent with the results described here. 
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We analyze both a signaling and a screening variant of the Spence education game, and we investigate the e®ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three. In all four treatments of the experiment, we¯nd a strong tendency to separate. Less e±cient types of workers only rarely make the costly investment while the more e±cient types usually do. Consistent with this¯nding, there is a signi¯cant wage spread, and workers who invest earn signi¯cantly more than those who do not invest. These main¯ndings are supported in all four treatments at the aggregate level but also at the session and the individual level. Taken together, these¯ndings strongly support the separating equilibrium prediction. An implication of this is that both signaling and screening can be used by employers as fairly e®ective sorting devices.
The separation of types is not complete in our data, and this leads to a number of¯ndings inconsistent with the separating equilibrium prediction. In particular, the wage spread is smaller than predicted and investment behavior does not signal a worker's type perfectly. This can be explained with some noisy behavior at the beginning of each session which leads to a persistent pattern of less than full separation. As in previous signaling experiments, path dependence is an important aspect of behavior, given the prominent role of beliefs about other players.
The comparison of signaling and screening with two and three employers suggests that signaling and screening institutions work similarly if there is enough competitive pressure between employers. With two employers, signaling is less competitive than screening. With three employers, the two institutions do not di®er and hence welfare and e±ciency are statistically the same. Though sessions with two employers are less competitive in terms of wages, we¯nd no evidence that adding a third employer leads to more investment in education.
These results indicate that, with su±ciently intense competition, it does not matter for the outcome whether the informed or the uninformed party moves¯rst. When competition is weak, workers would prefer to be screened while employers would prefer job candidates to move¯rst and signal their type. Thus, the low-ability type of the worker can under no circumstances gain from a deviation. On the other hand, the high-ability worker, who earns 30 in equilibrium, can potentially earn up to 60 ¡ 9 = 51 if he deviates by investing in education. Therefore, the only reasonable belief p of the employers after observing s = 1 should be one, i.e., p = Prob(a = high j s = 1) = 1: This belief, however, destroys the pooling equilibrium (3). The reason is that with this new belief employers would optimally o®er a wage of 50 after the signal s = 1 which would cause the high-ability type of the worker to deviate.
It is easy to see that no other equilibria exist. Pooling with s(low) = s(high) = 1 is not incentive compatible for the low -ability type. The pooling wage would be 30 again in this equilibrium which does not cover the low -ability type's investment cost of 45. Deviating to no investment yields a non-negative pro¯t no matter how the deviation is interpreted. Similarly, Appendix B: Instructions (for treatment SIG2)
Please read these instructions closely! Please do not talk to your neighbours and remain quiet during the whole experiment. If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come up to you to answer it.
In this experiment you can earn varying amounts of money, depending on which decisions you and other participants make. Your earnings in the experiment are denoted by points. In the beginning of the experiment, every participant receives 200 points as an initial endowment. Your total payo® at the end of the experiment is equal to the sum of your own payo®s in each round plus your initial endowment. For every 150 points you will be paid $1.
Description of the experiment
In the experiment, three participants interact with each other: one participant in the role of an employee and two participants in the role of employers. The employee can be of \type 1" or of \type 2". The experiment consists of several rounds, and at the beginning of each round, a random draw determines the employee's type. The random draw is such that both possible types of employee (\type 1" or \type 2") are equally probable to be drawn (50:50). After the random draw, the employee is informed about his/her type. However, the employers are not informed about the type of the employee.
Knowing his or her type, the employee has to decide whether or not he/she wants to make an investment. The costs of the investment depend on the employee's type: The investment cost of an employee of type 1 is 9 points and the investment cost of an employee of type 2 is 45 points. After the employee's investment decision, the employers are informed about whether the employee has made an investment or not. Knowing the investment decision of the employee, the two employers simultaneously decide which wage they want to o®er the employee. They can choose a wage between 0 and 60 points (if desired, up to two decimal places).
Given the two wage o®ers of the employers, the employee is hired by the employer who o®ered the higher wage. (If both employers make the same wage o®er, the computer decides randomly and with equal probability which of the two employers hires the employee.)
It is important to understand that the pro¯t of the employer who hires the employee depends both on the wage o®ered and on the employee's type, but not on the investment decision. This is explained in the following section.
Payo®s
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The payo® of the employee at the end of each round is given as follows:
² If the employee has not invested, he/she is paid the higher wage o®er, independently of his/her type.
² If the employee has invested, his/her payo® depends on the type:
{ If the employee is of type 1, his/her payo® is: higher wage o®er minus 9 points.
{ If the employee is of type 2, his/her payo® is: higher wage o®er minus 45 points.
The payo® of the employer, who hired the employee, depends on the employee's type:
² If the hired employee is of type 1, the employer's payo® is: 50 points minus wage o®er.
² If the hired employee is of type 2, the employer's payo® is: 10 points minus wage o®er.
In addition, both employers (that is, also the employer who did not hire an employee) receive a payo® of 25 points in every round.
Please note that the employer who has hired the employee makes losses if the wage o®er is greater than 50 and the employee is of type 1 or if the wage o®er is greater than 10 and the employee is of type 2.
Please note also that the employee makes losses if the cost of investment (in case an investment has been made) is higher than both wage o®ers. That is, an employee of type 1 makes losses if he/she invests and the higher wage o®er is below 9 points, and an employee of type 2 makes losses if he/she invests and the higher wage o®er is below 45 points.
To give you a clearer sense of the rules, the timing of events can be summarized as follows:
1. The computer randomly determines the employee's type. With a 50% probability the employee is either of type 1 or of type 2. After the random draw, the employee is informed about his/her type, but the employers are not informed about it.
2. The two employers simultaneously decide on their individual wage o®er (a number from the interval of 0 to 60).
3.
The employee is automatically hired by the employer who made the higher wage o®er. If both employers make the same wage o®er, a random draw (50:50) decides which employer hires the employee.
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4. The payo®s are given as described above.
Number of rounds and role assignment
The experiment consists of 48 rounds.
You will have to make decisions both as the employer and as the employee, alternating in the following way: The roles of all participants are randomly determined for 8 consecutive rounds.
After 8 rounds new roles are assigned to all participants that remain in place for another 8 rounds.
For example, a participant who had the role of the employee for the past 8 rounds, will have the role of the employer for the next 16 rounds (if the experiment is not over before this). Your computer screen shows you in every round which role you have in that round. At the end of each round, you are informed about the employee's type, the wage o®ers, and the payo®s of all three participants.
Please notice that in every round the groups of 3 players are randomly matched from the pool of all participants. We secure that it is always one employee and 2 employers who form one group.
Appendix C: Session and individual data 
